Meet the post-quantum mandates — without a rebuild.
A transparent TLS bridge in Rust on a FIPS 140-3 validated core. It makes existing systems quantum-safe in the data path — closing harvest-now / decrypt-later exposure — without touching application code.
The North American clock
U.S. federal high-value systems must reach PQC for key establishment by Dec 31, 2030. Enterprise migrations run 5–15 years—the gap is the exposure.
Harvest now, decrypt later.
Adversaries are already capturing long-lived encrypted data — health records, financial and insurance files, energy and defense traffic — to decrypt once a quantum computer arrives. With US and Canadian mandates pulling key-establishment deadlines forward to 2030–31, migration is a today decision, not a 2035 one.
Deploy it beside whichever end is still classical.
Each application keeps speaking its normal protocol. The bridge terminates TLS on both sides and turns the untrusted network hop into hybrid ML-KEM — the classical hop stays inside the trust boundary, exactly where harvest-now / decrypt-later exposure lives.
Either way, the classical hop stays inside the trusted boundary and the network hop is always hybrid post-quantum.
Agent / sidecar
Runs on or beside a legacy client; local apps connect as usual, and the bridge adds hybrid PQC on the outbound network hop.
Gateway / reverse proxy
Sits in front of legacy servers; modern clients connect over hybrid PQC and the bridge hands off classical to the backend.
Drop-in
No application code, no recompile, no protocol change for the app. You move one route at a time.
The standards are final. The deadlines are staged.
US Executive Order (June 2026): federal high-value systems to PQC for key establishment by Dec 31 2030, signatures by Dec 31 2031, with contractors held to PQC FIPS by end of 2030. Canada (Cyber Centre ITSM.40.001): high-priority systems by end of 2031, remainder by 2035. legacy
2026
Migration plans due. FIPS 140-2 modules move to Historical on September 21.
Plan · Inventory2030
U.S. PQC key establishment for high-value systems. Contractors meet PQC FIPS requirements.
Key establishment2031
U.S. PQC signatures. Canadian high-priority systems become quantum-safe.
Signatures · CA priority2035
Full transition for remaining systems and the long tail.
Full transitionEnterprise migrations realistically run 5–15 years. The gap between deadline and readiness is the exposure — which is why harvest-now / decrypt-later makes this a today decision.
Quantum-safe in the data path, four ways.
US Executive Order (June 2026): federal high-value systems to PQC for key establishment by Dec 31 2030, signatures by Dec 31 2031, with contractors held to PQC FIPS by end of 2030. Canada (Cyber Centre ITSM.40.001): high-priority systems by end of 2031, remainder by 2035. legacy
Bridge
Hybrid quantum-safe protection in the data path — no application rewrite. Low disruption, protecting the systems you can't touch.
Validated
FIPS 140-3 validated cryptographic core; post-quantum hybrid runs in FIPS-approved mode. Clears procurement and audit gates.
Agile
Swap algorithms and parameters by configuration as standards evolve — insurance against the next change, with no re-architecting.
Safe by design
Built in Rust — memory-safe, removing an entire class of implementation flaws from the crypto path.
Standards-based, crypto-agile, no proprietary math.
Algorithms and parameters live behind a policy abstraction, not in your call sites. Swap KEMs, curves, or parameter sets by configuration — a staged rollout of classical → hybrid → PQC-only.
| CAPABILITY | DETAIL | STANDARD / STATUS |
|---|---|---|
| Key establishment | ML-KEM-768 / -1024 · hybrid X25519+ML-KEM-768, P-384+ML-KEM-1024 |
Available
FIPS 203 · TLS hybrid drafts
|
| Protocol | TLS 1.3 — termination on both sides of the bridge |
Available
RFC 8446
|
| Signatures | ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, LMS / XMSS (firmware) |
Roadmap
FIPS 204 / 205 · SP 800-208
|
| Agility reserve | HQC backup KEM — negotiable when standardized |
Roadmap
NIST-selected 2025
|
| More protocols | SSH, IKEv2 / IPsec |
Roadmap
|
| Keys & PKI | PKCS#11 / HSM-backed storage, hybrid & dual-cert issuance |
Roadmap
|
What's protected, and what backs it.
The network hop is always hybrid.
The bridge sits next to whichever endpoint is still classical, so the classical hop stays inside the trust boundary — the same host, or the same rack / segment. In scope: confidentiality of data in transit across untrusted networks, against harvest-now / decrypt-later.
The network hop stays confidential as long as either the classical (X25519 / P-384) or the post-quantum (ML-KEM) component holds.
AWS-LC, a FIPS 140-3 validated module.
Built on AWS-LC via aws-lc-rs (fips) — the first open-source module to include ML-KEM in a FIPS 140-3 validation. Hybrid key establishment runs in FIPS-approved mode, with ML-KEM as the NIST-approved component. FIPS 140-3 certs #4631 / #4759 / #4816, single static binary, runs at the edge
~1,600 B
80–150 µs
Handshake figures are AWS-LC reference measurements, not SuperQubit benchmarks. FIPS 140-3 validation applies to the AWS-LC module operated in FIPS mode on covered operational environments; applicability depends on build configuration and environment.
Change algorithms without redeploying the app.
Central policy, per-endpoint enforcement. Pin the validated core in approved mode, negotiate hybrid where peers support it, and require PQC when you’re ready to refuse the downgrade.
# swap algorithms without redeploying the app
[policy.default]
kem = "x25519_mlkem768" # hybrid, quantum-safe
fallback = "x25519" # negotiate down for legacy peers
rollout = "hybrid" # classical | hybrid | pqc-only
require_pqc = false # true = refuse downgrade
fips_mode = true # pin validated core, approved mode
metrics = "otlp" # export negotiation telemetry
Aligned to the regulations that name the algorithms.
Specifies ML-KEM-1024 and ML-DSA-87, with a phased transition from 2027 through 2035.
Phases out RSA/ECC on a staged 2030 / 2035 timeline — deprecation after 2030, disallowance after 2035.
Validated cryptographic core as FIPS 140-2 modules move to Historical on September 21, 2026.
Requires cryptographic inventories and migration-progress reporting, including annual submissions.
Supports the 2026 / 2030 / 2035 transition milestones, including priority treatment for high-risk use cases.
What SQ-Bridge-PQC is not.
It secures the data path. It is not a cryptographic discovery or inventory scanner, not a governance / reporting dashboard, and not a certificate authority. Pair it with a readiness assessment for discovery and planning — the bridge is the enforcement layer that makes the traffic quantum-safe.
Highest harvest-now / decrypt-later exposure.
- Financial services
- Healthcare
- Insurance
- Energy & utilities
- Defense & government
- Telecom
Start with a quantum-readiness assessment.
A structured readiness assessment scopes your quantum-vulnerable systems and maps a phased, deadline-aligned migration path. The bridge is the enforcement layer that makes the traffic quantum-safe.